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In a September surprise, the Ethiopian government unveiled new currency notes. The change, the first in 23 years, has been the subject of much chatter. But few have seriously analyzed the significance of its timing, the official justifications, and various costs associated with the introduction of the new banknotes. In this piece, I will critically consider those concerns.

The rationale

The government ascribed the changing of banknotes to the existence of substantial amounts of illegal money circulating outside the banking system. However, this rationale is not backed by any credible evidence.

To begin with, the expression “illegal money circulating outside the banking system” is rather pedestrian. After all, there is always money circulating outside the banking system. In developing economies like Ethiopia, the bulk of transactions are undertaken using currency notes since most rural dwellers don’t own or use debit or credit cards.

Ethiopians almost exclusively rely on cash transactions. Only about 40 Ethiopians per 1000 adults (about 4 percent) own debit cards, according to the World Bank. The country ranks at the bottom of the world in debit card usage — ahead of only two war-torn countries, Afghanistan and Libya. In 2017, the percentage of adults with a bank account was only 35 percent. By contrast, 82 percent of Kenyan adults had a bank account.

The government did not provide estimates for the quantity of money beyond what is normally considered enough for the public to hold on hand to conduct day-to-day transactions.

It is not difficult to provide such estimates. First, the total amount of money in circulation at any given time can be calculated from records of quantities previously printed. Secondly, the government, which controls the banking sector, knows how much money is in the banking system. Third, since the size of Ethiopia’s gross domestic product and the velocity of money (the number of times a banknote is expected to change hands during a year) are known, it is possible to estimate the quantity of birr stashed away. (Birr is the unit of currency in Ethiopia). Instead of generating such evidence-base, the announcement of the new currency notes was based on hearsay analogy to justify their political decision.

Without such evidence, the official story line is not convincing. In fact, it appears to be a scapegoat for the country’s galloping inflation, officially reported as 16 percent in 2019 but realistically much higher especially in light of the deepening political crisis and market boycotts. Furthermore, the government can conveniently evade responsibility for the current economic problem by blaming the ruling party’s political arch-enemy who are suspected of stashing away billions.

Diversionary tactic

The timing of the currency change indicates that the main motivation of the Abiy administration was to divert the attention of the public and the international community away from domestic political crises.

When the demonetization was announced, the public was deeply engrossed in the fallout from the tragic assassination of iconic Oromo artist Haacaaluu Hundeessaa, including the sham pretrial hearings of prominent opposition leaders such as Jawar Mohammed, Bekele Gerba, Eskinder Nega, and others.

Additionally, it should be noted that the new currency was unveiled shortly after the Tigray regional election. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was roundly criticized for not sending in the federal army to stop the Tigray poll. Abiy had to appease his ultra-nationalist urban supporters by giving the impression that he had other tools to cripple the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). TPLF, the hitherto dominant party in Ethiopia, fell out with Abiy last year after it refused to join the prime minister’s Prosperity Party.

Since the introduction of the new banknotes, the public discourse has mostly been about trivial matters such as the graphics, colors, and print quality. This has given the government some respite, allowing the regime to tighten its grip on power; intensify attacks against opposition groups; and forge ahead with plans and campaign-style debates about the next election.

The cost of currency notes

The direct costs of changing banknotes can be classified into two. The first one is the cost incurred in hard currency to print the notes abroad and transport it to Ethiopia. The government reported that 2.9 billion notes were printed at the cost of 3.7 billion birr ($101.2 million).

The actual printing costs (plus international transportation costs) is likely to be around $250 million (148 percent of the official cost estimate), according to my estimate based on previous printing costs for Ethiopian currency notes and further adjustments for inflation. The government has deliberately reported a low figure to conceal the real cost from the public. The public would rightly object to waste of funds in the middle of a global pandemic and its economic impacts.

The second direct cost is logistical expenses within Ethiopia in terms of transporting and storage. The bulk notes would need to be moved under tight security to all bank branches in Ethiopia. One can imagine the number of bank branches in Ethiopia. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia alone has about 1,250 branches. If we consider the number of banks operating in Ethiopia and all their branches, the figure adds up to a colossal sum.

Still, the direct costs constitute a tiny fraction of the indirect cost of dispatching the new currency. These are diffused, non-monetary costs because of business disruptions.

For the business community, the currency change could not have come at the worst time.

Routine banking activities such as dispatching loans, serving customers, and facilitating transactions will mostly be disrupted. This would adversely affect business performances during the transition period. There is already more than enough disruption happening due to COVID-19.

The people of Ethiopia will carry the brunt of the costs associated with the disturbances created by the new currency notes. In a nutshell, the people’s livelihoods will be negatively affected in many ways, particularly for families who want to urgently conduct transactions for life-saving purposes.

Anomalies

These normally occurring direct and indirect costs are not even the end of the story. As with everything else in Ethiopia’s governance, mismanagement of dispatching the currency notes is expected to cause utter chaos. Strange things have started to happen from the outset. It suffices to mention just two botched pronouncements.

At the launch of the new currency notes, Abiy ordered the military forces — on a national TV — to confiscate from anyone found holding sums of money equal to or more than birr 1.5 million. He went even further, shockingly declaring that the army and police should keep the appropriated money for themselves. Following that marching order, the army has been frantically searching for illegal money, and numerous expropriations of large sums of birr have been reported within days and have intensified.

Authorities made another scandalous statement at the launch event. It was stated that customers who go to banks to exchange old notes with new ones would not be allowed to leave with more than birr 5,000, depositing the remaining balance was obligatory.

The fact is birr 5,000 is an extremely small sum of money. Suppose one wants to go back to the local market to buy cattle, whose costs would range in tens of thousands. It is extremely worrying that even bankers seem to be ignorant of the nature of transactions the society they serve undertake daily.

Ultimately, the biggest cost to society comes in terms of the distortions to normal governance and the extent to which the diversionary tactics turn public attention away from the political process and wasted opportunities to transition to democracy.

The primary purpose a country needs currency is to use it as a medium of exchange; it facilitates transitions in buying goods and services. For Ethiopia, the Birr, old or new, has no intrinsic economic value by itself. New currency notes would not affect the economic fundamentals in any way. In the end, notwithstanding the government’s claims, the catalog of costs likely to outweigh the benefits of demonetization by a considerable margin.

Ayele Gelan
Ayele Gelan is a research economist. He can be reached at augelana@gmail.com. Follow him at @AyeleGelan or dinagddee.com.

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3 Comments

  1. Thanks for a well written and timely article. The decission to change the currency notes dominated discussions in various circles for sometime. The debate centered around the palatability of government’s reasonings for the change: growing ilicit cross-border trade with some fiscal and security related consequences; increase in counterfeit currency and hoarding of cash causing higher inflation; and constrained ability of the NBE to use monetary policy instruments leading to lack of monetary policy effectiveness.

    The Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has not divulged severing relations with the TPLF as among the motivating factor for the change. This is to be expected on political economic considetations. Neverthless, I agree it is prudent to factor in politics as an additional dimenssion to it. Lack of liquidity that hit the Banking sector in northern Ethiopia and NBE’s liquidity injections accompanied by policies that somehow limitted cash withdrawals could be attributed in part to political tensions.
    I consider the problems Ethiopia faced (motivating the currency change) are common in the developing world. Ethiopia could have learnt from them. Changing the currency notes should have been taken as a last resort. It is not only a costly exercise, its effectiveness in sustainably addressing the problems could be doubted. The problems mentioned are manifestations of weak governance and macroeconomic management. Therefore, reforms in these areas should have been a priority to address the root causes. Without reforms, there is no guarantee that the country will not find itself immersed in a similar predicament in the near future.

    The problems are a combination of structura and governance related. Take for instance the galooping inflation; it is caused by pilot money to finance government deficit (implying fiscal dependency/weak NBE autonomy) on the one hand and lower productivity on the other. These are among the targets in the ‘Home Grown Reform Agenda (HGRA)” coming in the form of financial and private sector development reforms. If the government is convinced that the reform agenda is upto the task (i.e. structural change), why not give these policy reforms the chance?
    The others namely illegal cross-border trade, counterfeit currency notes and increase in cash hoarding by the public are political and economic governance issues. The GoE could have at least tried to address them by strengthening/introducing integrated M&E mechanisms, restoring peoples’ confidence on the political system and enhancing Banking sector’s reach to the large unbanked population.

  2. Thank you for the insightful remarks.

    Explaining public policy decision is like peeling an onion. In that piece I did not bother to spend much time on the coarse outer cover, which was placed there by the authorities to engage us in debating them. If they were serious about those rationales, then they should have provided us with the facts, as discussed.

    You’ve raised an interesting dimension: the liquidity crisis the authorities claimed to have existed towards the end of the fourth quarter of 2019. However, we really need between the lines with such matters. Timing is everything here.

    At the same time the liquidity crisis dropped out of thin air, the govt was frantically engaged in getting multi-billion loan deals with IMF and the World Bank. And we know lowering inflation is always a strict conditionality accompanying those loans. Apparently the government was doing something to give the impression that the were restricting money supply to convince the lenders that they were serious with lowering inflation.

    So I suspect the liquidity crisis was not something that came into existence through changes in normal economic fundamentals as such but perhaps a deliberate act on part of the government.

    After all the duration of news about the liquidity crisis was about the same time when the deal for the loans were being made.

  3. […] him and his party. Abiy hit back by declaring the Tigray regional government illegitimate, demonetizing the banknotes, and withdrawing federal subsidies to the region, a decision seen by the TPLF as a declaration of […]

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